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ABSTRACT
Pricing and Eminent Domain Takings:
A Case Study of Residential Property 
in Las Vegas, Nevada
by
W illiam  Charles Kuhn
Dr. R. Keith Schwer, Exam ination C om m ittee Chair 
Professor o f Econom ics 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
This case study tests w hether compensation for em inent dom ain takings equals 
estimated m arket prices for residential property located near M cCarran Airport in C lark 
County Nevada. The hedonic model provides evidence that takings com pensation was 
often less than estim ated m arket price, a discount was paid to ow ners o f sm aller homes, 
and a premium was paid  to owners o f larger hom es. A lthough data constraints, 
estimation issues and lack o f previous studies ham per broad conclusions, the robust data 
set. consistency o f  m odel specification results, and the explanatory power o f  econom ic 
thought is evident in these results. The results are som ew hat surprising in that M cCarran 
International Airport is very m uch an integral aspect o f  Las Vegas. It is recom m ended 
that hedonic analysis be considered as a com ponent o f  estim ating fair market value. 
Further research will hopefully  expand this prelim inary effort and eventually improve 
understanding and executing the responsibilities o f em inent dom ain.
Il l
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Em inent domain grants governm ent the right to  take private property within its 
boundaries without the ow ner’s consent provided the taking is for a public use and just 
com pensation is paid. The conditions o f  public use and ju s t com pensation raise 
num erous legal, political, h istorical, and moral issues. F o r exam ple, in the United States 
ju st com pensation legally requires payment of fair m arket value, but without the benefit 
o f inform ation from m arket-style negotiation. Still, in the final analysis, the overriding 
principle is that the public in terest takes precedent over private interest.
But what is fair market value? One might reasonably infer that fair market value in 
an em inent dom ain taking calls for governm ent paym ent equal to price determined in a 
com petitive m arket, that is, m eeting the efficiency requirem ents o f  Pareto optimality. I 
found no study, however, that has quantified how em inent dom ain prices compare with 
m arket prices, though one can identify scenarios in w hich the governm ent might pay 
discounts (takings payments less than market value) or prem ium s (takings payment 
greater than m arket value). For exam ple, following Breton (1974), a government 
exploiting its monopolist position  could  discrim inate in its paym ent for takings. One 
m ight expect a discount when the governm ent uses m arket pow er adversely to the 
interests o f the property ow ner and  a prem ium  when governm ent responds to influential
1
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political power from the property  owner. Thus, econom ic o r political influences could 
account for a discount or prem ium  paid for em inent dom ain takings.
The Pareto optim ality postulate for welfare m axim ization lim its social choice to the 
Pareto efficient frontier. T his norm ative measurement offers little comfort for positive 
assessm ent, however. The lack o f a social welfare function gives rise to contested issues 
and little agreement. Again, I found no study that evaluates w hether takings' 
com pensation is consistent am ong homeowners o f the sam e or different levels o f 
econom ic well-being, that is, horizontal and vertical equity  in takings. If the size o f a 
home im plies wealth, one m easure of well-being, a significant difference between 
com pensation for takings and m arket prices for homes o f  different size may suggest 
vertical inequality, and variability between takings com pensation and market prices for 
a given size o f home may suggest horizontal inequality.
To address the efficiency and equity issues for em inent dom ain takings, I estim ate 
an hedonic model that can be used to quantify the differences between the estim ated 
m arket prices and com pensations for takings. I investigate the size, sign, and statistical 
significance o f these differences. My first hypothesis is that governm ents do provide ju st 
com pensation, that is, governm ent does not system atically take advantage o f people or 
is m anipulated by special interest property owners by paying takings compensation (fair 
m arket value) that differs from  estim ated market value. I also model the price difference 
between takings and m arket prices with home size, thereby em pirically investigating 
whether government takings’ com pensation is neutral on the issue o f horizontal and 
vertical equity, as m easured by  hom e size, my second hypothesis.
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The data  analyzed is from  the C lark  County A ssessor's O ffice and McCarran 
International Airport. The large num ber o f  takings in and around M cCarran Airport 
during the 1990s offers a robust se t o f  observations to test these tw o hypotheses. House 
sale price is regressed against five  interval and seven dum m y variables o f housing 
characteristics, two location dum m y variables, three year o f sale dum m y variables, a 
takings dum m y variable, and the three interaction variables—takings and size o f home, 
ou tlier and living space, and ou tliers and takings. I com pare alternative hedonic model 
specifications and identify strengths and weaknesses. In addition, m easurem ent errors, 
critical estim ation issues, and sam ple  sets incorporating outlier adjustm ents are 
addressed. A fter analyzing the m odels, conclusions regarding the hypotheses follow.
F indings suggest that com pensation prices paid for takings in the M cCarran Airport 
environs during the m id-1990s d iffe r from estim ated m arket prices; takings were at a 
d iscount for smaller hom es and a prem ium  for larger hom es; and residuals-to-home size 
for takings exceed the residuals-to-hom e size for m arket sales. As such, the findings 
point to inefficiency and inequity.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review  draw s from several fields o f  study. W elfare economics 
provides a theoretical fram ew ork to transform general questions on em inent domain into 
testable hypotheses. Previous studies o f housing prices and hedonic indexes provide 
important guidance on specification o f market price equations. Equally important, the 
legal environm ent o f em inent domain ties together taking procedures, normative welfare 
econom ics and my hypotheses, shedding light on the equity and  efficiency o f this case 
study o f eminent dom ain takings.
Em inent Dom ain M ay Be W elfare Im proving 
Given that a property is often transferred from the private to  the public sector by 
em inent domain, welfare im provem ent is an important issue. M unger (2000) and 
Takayam a (1993) provide m uch o f  the information reviewed here. M any economists 
have contributed ideas relevant to my eminent domain study, including Pareto, Pigou, 
Coase, Kaldor, and H icks w ith each having a given preference as to whether 
governm ent activity m ight o r  m ight not be Pareto im proving. M ost notably, Pareto 
developed the efficiency and equity postulates o f welfare econom ics that are among the 
few that have held up to general agreement. The contribution o f  Pigou and Coase
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focuses on the efficacy o f public and private actions to m eet efficiency conditions. 
Pigou identified externality  conditions violating Pareto efficiency criteria that suggested 
governm ent solutions, w hereas Coase demonstrated conditions w hereby voluntary 
negotiations without transactions cost yield Pareto efficiency conditions. Still, meeting 
efficiency criteria m ay fall far short o f  a desired equitable outcom e. Kaldor and Hicks 
recognized that voluntary exchanges between individuals could  im prove overall well­
being. K aldor's com pensation principle, trading partners find them selves better off 
when winners com pensate losers, underlies Pareto im provem ent action o f eminent 
dom ain activity.
The Pareto efficiency criterion calls for choosing the static state that is superior to 
the others and thereby m axim izing the efficiency gain to society, but with no explicit 
requirem ent to com pensate individuals that may suffer a loss, nor requiring individuals 
to participate in any exchange not advantageous to that individual. In short, benefits 
accrue to whomever they accrue, but unanimity o f decision is needed. Under its weak 
form, not all individuals end up being better off, some will only  be indifferent. As such, 
everyone may not w illingly participate in a Pareto im proving activity. A holdout could 
easily forestall activity, thereby precluding the social gain. T hus, one could argue that 
governm ent intervention in the form o f  eminent dom ain may be Pareto  improving.
The Coase (1960) postulate is that when transaction costs are zero, an efficient use 
o f resources may result from private bargaining, regardless o f  the legal assignment of 
property rights. W hen transaction costs are too high and prevent bargaining, however, 
the efficient use o f resources will depend on how property rights are assigned. W ithout 
em inent domain, acquisition o f  private property would cause governm ent to satisfy
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holdouts seeking to capture the p ro jec t’s added social value, perhaps even being Pareto 
deteriorating. Alternatively, the holdout could be unwilling to bargain, a situation of 
infinite transaction costs. Thus. C oase’s analytical insight focuses on efficiency 
conditions, ignoring the equity issues o f individual gains and losses.
Still, the Kaldor com pensation approach comes closest to giving a norm ative 
rationale for eminent domain takings. It does not require unanim ity and it allows, 
through gainers compensating losers, m ovem ent toward a Pareto im proving outcome. 
The norm ative findings o f welfare econom ics point to how em inent dom ain may 
im prove efficiency and equity. M ueller (1974) notes there may be “som e slippage 
betw een the lips of voters and the flow of outputs from the governm ent cup.” The 
positive theory o f public choice raises questions regarding governm ent takings behavior. 
Em pirical analysis offers evidence for evaluating eminent dom ain im pacts.
Hedonic Pricing is Useful for the Housing M arket
Hedonic pricing is still developing, but considerable agreem ent exists on its 
application to housing. Rosen (1974) in his path breaking article and m ore recently 
Palm quist (1991) provide the key literature cited here. The hedonic m odel is a revealed 
preference method that extracts the im plicit marginal value o f  hom ogeneous 
characteristics (such as a bathroom ) o f a heterogeneous product (such as a residential 
home). The price o f a home (P) is explained by a vector o f characteristics (z) such that P 
= P  (z). Simply put, the estim ated price o f  a hom e is the sum m ation o f an im plied price 
o f its characteristics generated from  an array o f  data on actual hom e transactions.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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The two m ost troubling issues addressed in the hedonic literature are:
1) sim ultaneity, and
2) proper specification and estim ation o f attribute prices consistent with 
econom ic theory.
A m ajor problem  with housing is that quantity  and price o f each com ponent are 
chosen sim ultaneously. This precludes identifying a shift versus m ovem ent along supply 
and dem and relationships. The essence o f  the problem  lies in the fact that existing data 
sets typically do not provide enough inform ation to  describe supply, dem and, and 
marginal prices reliably. D iamond and Sm ith (1985) also argue that sim ultaneity results 
from price relations between characteristics. They recom m end m ultiple tim e period data 
as one solution, an approach adopted here.
The second concern in developing an appropriate model is pooling o f cross-section 
and tim e series data, which challenges the assum ption of constant intercept and slope. 
O m itted observations may lead to changing cross-section and tim e series intercepts, 
error term s may be correlated over tim e and cross-section units, and heteroscedasticity 
or serial correlation can occur. Though num erous m odels have been developed to 
address panel data  sets, see W oodridge (2000), I follow  Pindyck’s (1991) 
recom m endation, separating year o f sale into annual dummy variables as separate 
intercepts. In o ther words, although this da ta  set cou ld  be analyzed as a  panel data set, I 
analyze it as cross-sectional and time series data. I believe this approach to be a reliable 
one given the sporadic nature o f  home sales.
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Estimating Hedonic H ousing Equations 
G rether and M ieszkowski (1974) developed m odels that included living space, 
num ber o f  bathroom s, num ber o f rooms, lot size, and age as variables, specifying age as 
quadratic. Linneman (1980) developed m odels that did not include any lot 
characteristics or interaction variables, using living space, num ber o f  bathroom s, 
num ber o f  non bathroom s, age, and a num ber o f dum m y variables to account for quality 
characteristics and neighborhood. Studem und (2001) states that specifications o f 
housing price equations are a m atter of choice and experience, but his favorites based on 
theoretical grounds include living space, neighborhood, age, age squared, lot size and a 
dum m y for air conditioning.
Fair M arket Value is a Legal Construct 
The legal requirem ents of eminent dom ain add vital insight. Em inent dom ain is a 
subset o f governm ent restrictions on private property, in which the injured party 
receives “just com pensation” based on “fair m arket value” if governm ent takes a 
property. In the United States, the legal basis o f  em inent dom ain evolved from  England 
com m on law. Em inent domain is defined by US and state constitutions and statutes, and 
is supplem ented by administrative rules and jud icia l opinions.
There is no national land acquisition policy, rather a montage o f  institutional rules 
recognized by local jurisdictions defines em inent dom ain procedures. In essence, the 
governm ent may take private property within its boundaries for public use, but 
valuations paid for ju st compensation may vary in accord with local rules. Faced with 
diversity, jud iciary  interpretation ultimately arbitrates.
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Em inent domain takings d iffer from regulatory takings in that regulatory takings use 
governm ent police pow ers such as nuisance laws, zoning regulations, and sim ilar 
restrictions on private property. A lthough regulatory takings are som etim es challenged 
under em inent domain law , they rem ain different. Regulatory takings are not addressed 
directly in this paper. Rather, th is paper focuses on eminent dom ain condem nations that 
use governm ent’s constitu tional pow er to redistribute land ownership to the public 
sector from the private secto r in exchange for paym ent based on the legal concept o f fair 
m arket value.
Em inent domain uses m arket appraisals to establish fair m arket value, but this value 
is not necessarily the sam e value established in com petitive markets. Once a public 
project defines the land to be acquired, an appraiser applies market data to a specific 
property, and expresses an op in ion  in writing o f the fair market value at a po in t in time. 
As stated by the A m erican R ight o f  W ay Association(1972), a recognized professional 
association o f  appraisers, “F air m arket value is a reflection o f opinion and has no 
scientific validity beyond the care and skill applied by the appraiser in gathering, 
organizing, and analyzing the inform ation. The data are drawn from num erous sources 
that have varying degrees o f  reliability  and applicability for the present valuation. The 
m arket accuracy o f the evaluation depends on the degree of detail and objectiv ity  in the 
appraiser’s analysis o f  all available m arket data” .
In an effort to bring consistency  to valuations, the American Right o f W ay 
Association and m any ju risd ic tions have established professional requirem ents that 
appraisers must meet and m ethodologies they must follow. Typically, appraisers use the 
com parative sales, cost, and incom e methods. If m ore than one m ethod is u sed  that
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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creates different results, the appraiser extracts, and hopefully justifies, a statem ent o f 
final value estim ate. This statement o f value incorporates nuances o f nonm arket 
valuations involving appraisal concepts and institutional rules.
This statem ent o f value is typically w hat is o ffered  to the property ow ner, who may 
accept it, contest it based on the same institutional constraints, o r sim ply refuse the 
offer. The governm ent entity can attem pt to  conclude negotiations, or begin judicial 
condem nation proceedings. The governm ent may obtain  occupancy w hile proceedings 
continue. Sellers typically receive lengthy advance notice o f a taking, and they may have 
had input to the appraisal. Negotiations betw een the governm ent and the landow ners 
begin with the governm ent offer. If these negotiations fail, the governm ent’s legal staff 
files suit to take the property. Negotiations may continue during litigation. If necessary, 
a judge or ju ry  may ultim ately set fair m arket value and  the proceedings end. An appeal 
process is available, but seldom used.
Obviously, the essential elem ent o f  the process is establishing fair m arket value. Fair 
m arket value is defined in Black’s Law D ictionary as the “amount at w hich property 
would exchange hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under 
any com pulsion to buy o r sell and both having reasonable knowledge o f  the relevant 
facts. The price is in cash, or its equivalent, that the property would have brought at the 
time o f taking, considering its highest and m ost profitable use, if  then offered  for sale in 
the open market, in com petition with other sim ilar properties at o r near the location of 
the property taken, with a  reasonable tim e allow ed to  find  a purchaser.” It is im portant 
to note that ju st com pensation may be less than full com pensation. Full com pensation 
includes m onopoly pricing and any holdout value.
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The legal process o f em inent dom ain takings uses expert opinion in developing 
estim ates as a basis for negotiations. The buyer and seller have an opportunity  for 
negotiation, which substitutes for a m arket transaction. If negotiations fail, the court 
provides a safety net for the reasonable transfer o f property from  the private to the 
public sector. In making the offer for a  taking, governm ent self-in terest and the 
application o f appraisal procedures m ay result in an outcom e that is not one o f fair 
m arket value.
Sum mary
This literature review shows that the analysis o f eminent dom ain takings rests on 
norm ative principles of welfare econom ics, the positive analysis o f  public choice, and 
the econom etric analysis o f housing prices using hedonic analysis, and the institutional 
legal fram ework. The literature provides reasons for takings com pensation to differ from 
expected m arket prices and suggests that expected market prices can be m odeled with 
an hedonic equation.
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C H A PTER  3
MODEL SPECIFICA TIO N  AND HY PO THESES
M y goal is to test whether com pensation for em inent dom ain takings equals 
estim ated m arket price, using an hedonic model, and investigate w hether the difference 
betw een takings compensation and estim ated market price varies with home size. Price, 
the dependent variable under study, and the property characteristics used as explanatory 
variables, are presented in Table 1.
The General M odel and Hypotheses 
The general hedonic pricing model can be sum m arized as:
Price = f  (takings indicator, location, year o f sale,
house characteristics, outlier indicator) (3-1 )
The takings indicator equals one for a takings and zero for a market sale. A positive 
takings regression coefficient implies a prem ium , a negative value im plies a discount, 
and a value close to zero implies m arket price equals takings price. Location and year o f 
sale are also dum m y variables, house characteristics is a vector o f interval and dummy 
variables, and the outlier indicator captures the effects o f possible m ism easurem ent. The 
interaction variables of the explanatory variables provide additional inform ation. For 
exam ple, if Takings*Living Space is negative, larger homes receive less; if positive,
12
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Table 1; Description o f Variables
Variable Description
Price Sales price o f  a hom e; market o f by eminent domain
PSF Sales price per square foot
Takings T akings= l for em inent domain, 
Takings=0 for a  m arket sale
Takings*Living Space Takings X living space (0 for market sales)
Living Space living space o f a home
Living Space Sqd square o f  living space
Total Rooms room s in a  hom e, including baths
Baths Full baths-Fl/2 X half-baths
Other Space Patio + carport + storage + converted; m inim um  o f 1
Age Sale year-effective year finished; m inim um  o f 1
Age Squared Square o f age
Upgrade Hom es w here effective year > construction year
Intercom Home with an intercom
Fireplace Hom e with 1 or m ore fireplaces
Pool Home with a pool o f any size
Jacuzzi Hom e with a Jacuzzi
Septic Home with a septic tank rather than sewer, may also be 
proxy for a large lot
No Garage Garage space = 0
One Car Garage Garage space up to 300 square feet
T wo C ar Garage Garage space up to 600 square feet
>Tw o C ar Garage Garage space > 600 square feet
Location 162-25,26.27 North 3 square m iles o f study area
Location 162-35,36 C enter 3 square m iles o f study area
Location 177-1,2,3,4 Southern 4  square miles o f study area
1993 Sale occurred in 1993
1994 Sale occurred in 1994
1995 Sale occurred in 1995
1996 Sale occurred in 1996
Outlier Defined by Hadi m ethod on psf
Takings*O utlier Em inent dom ain outliers
O utlier*Living Space O utlier X living space
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larger homes receive m ore, other things being equal. The primary null hypotheses, 
tested at the 10 % (*), 5 %(**), and 1 %(***)  level o f  significance is that there is no 
statistically significant differences between:
1 ) market price and com pensation for em inent dom ain takings after accounting for
housing and other characteristics, and
2) takings and m arket valuations according to hom e size.
Predictions o f  Theory 
Theory provides a prediction of the sign (positive or negative) o f coefficients for 
some, but not all, variables composing the general model. The coefficients o f  Takings 
and Takings*Living Space may be positive, zero , or negative. Similarly, the location 
variable is relative to an arbitrary reference location, and no coefficient sign is predicted. 
The coefficients o f living space and other space are expected to be positive. C oefficients 
o f total rooms and baths are also expected to be positive, but an interaction w ith living 
space may produce a negative value. Age is expected  to have a negative coefficient. The 
coefficients o f the quadratic transformations o f  living space and age may be positive or 
negative. The coefficients o f year are expected to  be positive, reflecting housing m arket 
inflation. Bundling annual sales as a dum my variable, and this study’s relatively short 
time period, may w eaken the explanatory pow er o f  these variables. The coefficients for 
intercom, fireplace, pool, Jacuzzi, septic, and garage are expected to be positive. O utlier 
coefficients and interactions o f outlier may be positive or negative. Upgrade is positive 
if m odifications increase value and negative if  m odifications decrease value.
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C H A PT E R  4
TH E D A TA
The analysis o f  this da ta  set compares housing prices for market sales and em inent 
domain takings in C lark County using data from  M cCarran Airport and the C lark 
County A ssessor’s Office. The study area, presented in Figure 1, is bounded by 
Tropicana A venue. Las Vegas Boulevard, Pecos Road and Warm Springs A venue.
I -
X L
Figure 1. Study A rea
15
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
16
D ata D escription
From  the nine fiscal years (1994-2002) o f  assessor data and twelve years (1990- 
2001) o f takings data, four years o f sales w ere selected for analysis. Data availability, 
the num ber o f  takings, and a representative m ix o f takings and market transactions were 
criteria  used in the selection o f the years to  study. The nine sections (each one square 
m ile) were com bined to create three location variables.
A breakdow n of sales by location and year o f sale is provided in Table 2 and Table 
3, show ing 115 takings and 2,134 m arket sales. In addition to the time and location 
variables, price is regressed against five housing  characteristics using interval scales, 
seven dum m y variables of housing characteristics, a  takings dum my differential, and an 
interaction variable o f takings differential and size o f  home.
Table 2; N um ber and Percentage o f M arket Sales and Takings for the M cCarran Airport 
Study A rea by Year; 1990-2(X)1
Year Total
Sales
M arket
Sales
Takings Percent
Takings
1990 78 1 77 99%
1991 67 0 67 100%
1992 63 0 63 100%
1993 96 50 46 48%
1994 889 853 36 4%
1995 627 608 19 3%
1996 637 623 14 2%
1997 499 497 2 <1%
1998 567 555 12 2%
1999 651 646 5 1%
2000 509 506 3 1%
2001 299 229 0 0%
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Table 3: Number and Percentage o f  M arket Sales and Takings for the M cCarran Airport 
Study Area by Location and Year: 1993-96
Section Market Sales Takings Percent Takings
162-25 750 0 09c
162-26 461 1 <17c
162-27 177 0 0%
162-35 1 71 >99%
162-36 51 36 41%
177-01 66 0 0%
177-02 569 3 <1%
177-03 43 3 7%
177-04 6 1 17%
Possible O utliers and Adjustm ents Taken 
The descriptive statistics o f the key housing characteristics variables o f  the 
com bined data set (m arket sales and takings) are presented in Table 4. A cursory 
exam ination of these sum m aries offers credible evidence that som e outliers may be 
present, which I believe to be prim arily m easurem ent errors. A price per square foot of 
$4.44 as shown in Table 4  as a m inim um  value is not possible under norm al conditions. 
Construction costs during this period in Las Vegas began at around $40 per square foot. 
To be sure, price can be less than this due to  depreciation, functional obsolescence.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics o f Key Variables for the Com bined D ata  Set (2,249 
observations) Before A djusting for O utliers
Variable M ean Std. Dev. M in. M ax.
Price 115550 115320 7000 3700000
Living Space 1505 823 462 12405
Total Rooms 5.33 1.70 3 18
Baths 2.16 .70 1 9
O ther Space 271 426 1 4297
Age 10.55 10.50 1 59
Price psf 75.65 23.71 4.44 489.46
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics o f K ey V ariables for the Takings Data Set ( 110 
observations) After Adjusting for 5 O utliers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. M ax.
Price 150082 96470 65000 465000
Living Space 1873 876 972 4668
Total Room s 6.08 1.26 4 12
Baths 2.16 .57 1 4
O ther Space 549 535 1 2956
Age 24.12 8.99 2 45
Price psf 76.79 17.57 25.65 126.24
Table 6; D escriptive Statistics o f  Key V ariables for the M arket Data Set (2.095 
observations) After Adjusting for 39 O utliers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. M ax.
Price 107293 59937 15000 945970
Living Space 1470 763 462 11278
Total Room s 5.29 1.70 3 18
Baths 2.16 .69 1 9
Other Space 247 396 1 4297
Age 9.67 9.96 1 59
Price psf 73.44 12.78 19.06 128.86
personal crises or distressed property; nevertheless, one would be hard pressed to accept 
as reasonable a price per square foot (psf) in Las Vegas under S20 per square foot. 
R ather than elim inate these observations perceived to be questionable, how ever, I 
perform ed a Hadi (1992) m ultivariate ou tlier test on price per square foot o f living 
space. This criteria appears appropriate as this test resulted in more believable 
descriptive statistics, presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6. W hereas $4.44 p sf is assuredly not 
reasonable, the range o f $ 19.06 p sf to S 128.86, on the other hand, is a reasonable range 
o f  expected values. Summary statistics for the com bined, takings, and m arket data sets
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are provided in Tables 7. The variable O utlier, a dum m y variable equal to  one for the 5 
em inent dom ain outliers and the 39 m arket ou tliers, identified these outlying 
observations.
Table 7; M ean Values o f Com bined, M arket, and Takings Data Sets Before and After
Excluding O utliers
Variable Com­
bined
Before
Com­
bined
After
Market
Before
Market
After
Takings
Before
Takings
After
Price 115550 109428 107293 113242 158374 150082
Takin.gs 0.051 .050 0 0 1 11.76
Takings*Living
Space
97.01 93.43 0 0 1897 1873
Living Space 1505 1491 1897 1484 1897 1873
Total Rooms 5.33 5.32 5.29 5.29 6.09 6.089
Baths 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.164
Other Space 271 263 248 254 592 549
Age 10.18 10.39 9.67 9.82 23.93 24.12
Upgrade .044 .043 .033 .035 .21 .23
Intercom 0.039 .036 .032 .034 .13 .12
Fireplace 0.65 0.65 .66 .65 .61 .59
Fool 0.16 0.16 .15 .15 .24 .24
Jacuzzi 0.054 .053 .054 .055 .035 .027
Septic 0.027 .024 .020 .023 .11 .11
No Garage 0.41 .41 .41 .41 .45 .46
One Car Garage 0.030 .027 .028 .031 .017 .018
Two Car Garage 0.48 .48 .49 .49 .37 .36
>Two Car Garage 0.083 r.079 .078 .079 .17 .16
Location
162-25,26,27
0.62 .62 .65 .65 .0087 0
Location 162-35,36 0.071 .068 .023 .025 .93 .94
Location 177- 
l .2,3,4
0.31 .31 .324 .324 .061 .064
1993 0.043 .043 .024 .023 .40 .40
1994 0.40 .40 .40 .34 .31 .33
1995 0.28 .28 .284 .285 .17 .16
1996 0.28 .28 .294 .285 .12 .11
observations 2249 2249 2095+39 2134 1 115 110+5
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Variable Specifications 
Identifying outliers is but one of many steps used to become fam iliar with the data 
and thereby reduce the chance o f unseemly errors in the analysis. In an effort to further 
improve my estim ation. Living Space Squared and Age Squared are generated 
independent variables. Living space is often the m ost critical characteristic in 
detem iining price o f  housing. As such, adding a transform ation o f living space may 
significantly im prove estim ation. Age squared is another unique variable, included as 
recom m ended by G rether and M ieszkowski (1974).
Additional variables are added or generated to  assist in the analysis. Takings is the 
dummy variable identifying prices determined through em inent domain, the prim ary 
thesis variable. T his Takings indicator is 1 for em inent dom ain properties, otherw ise it 
equals 0. If the coefficient o f Takings is positive, a prem ium  is implied, and if negative, 
a discount is im plied. Takings*Living Space is a generated variable identifying living 
space o f a takings property, the second thesis variable. Takings*O utlier identifies the 
five takings that w ere identified as outliers by the Hadi procedure. O utlier*Living Space 
identifies Living Space o f all 44 outliers. This m ethod allow s retention o f the outliers in 
the data set, but isolates their influence.
The location variables com bine several sections (square miles) of land in an 
important way. C asinos, airport noise, heavy traffic, and an increased urban intensity 
impact this area o f  Las Vegas. These impacts are generally  felt in an east-w est rather 
than north-south direction. The casinos are predom inantly  north of this area. A uto  traffic 
in this area is principally in an east-west direction. A ircraft landings are predom inantly 
from the east and takeoffs to the west. In all, the im pacts tend to be intense in an east-
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west, linear fashion. Therefore, by geographically  com bining the observations linearly in 
an east-w est m anner, these various im pacts m ay  be accounted for.
T he year o f  sale variable is inherently im perfect. As a dummy variable, it lum ps an 
entire year’s sales in one class, a potential g roup ing  problem . This makes a sale in 
any m onth o f the sam e year equal, which p robab ly  does not reflect a monthly inflation 
som e m ight anticipate. This is another case w here  hedonic analysis m ust be done in an 
im perfect world.
How This D ata S et W as Created
As previously discussed, this data com bines takings and market sale data. The 
procedure o f developing the takings data set w as as follows:
1 ) The M cCarran A irport data set contained 6 8 8  takings, and identified each parcel 
num ber, sale price, and closing date.
2) Parcel num bers were matched with assessor da ta  files to generate the characteristics 
o f that parcel.
3) The parcels with positive values for "bed room ,’’ "living space,” and "construction 
year” were kept, thereby elim inating undeveloped  land, commercial, and other non- 
residential property.
The procedure o f developing the m arket d a ta  set was similar. The Clark County 
A ssessor’s office provided data on 4 ,636  sales that were reduced to 4,502 residential 
m arket sales in the surrounding area betw een 1993 through 2001, as follows:
1 ) N ine fiscal years (1994-2002) o f data were ob ta ined  from  the Clark County A ssessor. 
Each year had two files o f  characteristics, w hich w ere com bined by m atching parcel
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num bers. Seventeen parcels were elim inated because a parcel num ber had one sale price 
associated with two sets of property characteristics.
2) Since the data set contained every assessor parcel, only those recording an “arms 
length" transaction were kept (sales type R), and subsequently only those parcels 
registering a  positive number in the fields “bedroom ", “living space" and "construction 
year "w ere kept. Seven observations w ere deleted because the assessor archived files 
had no entry for a critical field such as “sales price". In addition, 334 observations were 
deleted at 7000 Paradise Road because all 334 were listed at $2 m illion each, sold in 
N ovem ber o f 1996, obviously not an accurate sales price for a residential unit at that 
location.
3) The assessor's m arket data sets for each year were then com bined, yielding 
approxim ately 17,000 observations. T his data set, however, had m any duplicates of 
actual sales, so duplicates were deleted. For instance, if a house sold tw ice in the 9 year 
period, the property would be in each fiscal year data sets, but only tw ice in the final 
data set. The assessor file of m arket sales and the eminent dom ain file w ere then 
com bined, adding a field "takings” , w here m arket data value was 0  and taking value set 
at 1, for use as a dum m y variable.
4) Values o f living space and age were used to generate transform ations living space 
squared and age squared. Age and O ther Space were given m inim um  values o f 1, so log 
transform ations could be generated.
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Sum m ary
This study uses a data set that enables a comparison o f em inent dom ain takings 
com pensation with estim ated m arket prices. The outlier adjustm ents taken improve 
analysis while keeping the data set intact. The model and variables are specified to 
allow evaluation of alternative functional form , testing for assum ption violations, and 
corrective actions, if warranted.
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CH A PTER 5 
RESULTS
This analysis o f eminent dom ain takings rests on econom ic principles, follows 
available guidance on model specification, and uses a robust da ta  set. The com bining of 
two data sets, the specification o f  the location variables, the potential for om itted 
variables, and the lack of prior studies suggest a larger than usual review  o f alternative 
model specification is appropriate. M y evaluations include goodness o f fit, overall fit, 
m ulticollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and other analyses to extract as much reliable 
information as can be reasonably accom plished.
A lternative Functional Forms 
The literature of hedonic equations for urban housing prices fails to establish a 
specific functional form or the exact explanatory variables to include in an analysis. 
Though the evidence provides guidance, I use popular functional form s, an often used 
first step, and add three power transform ations suggested by a B ox-C ox analysis. In all, 
eight ordinary least squares model specifications (OLS) are developed. The m odels are 
referred to as log or linear, but are not in the strictest sense. That is, right hand side 
variables may not all be linear because o f  transform ations o f a dependent variable, but 
the equations are linear in terms o f  the param eters. This exception noted, the model
24
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specifications to be estim ated are:
1 ) Linear-Linear using sales price as the  dependent variable.
2) Linear-Linear (PSF) using sales p rice  per square foot as dependent variable.
3) Log-Linear,
4) Linear-Log,
5) Log-Log,
6) A Theta-Lam bda functional form m odel, a Linear-Linear model using RHS-LHS 
(right hand side-left hand side) B ox-C ox  param eters to transform  the dependent and 
independent numeric variables,
7) A Theta functional form model, a L inear-L inear model using RHS (right hand side 
only) Box-Cox parameters to transform  independent numeric variables, and
8) A Lam bda functional form m odel, a  Linear-L inear model using LHS (left hand side 
only) Box-Cox parameter to transform  the dependent variable.
All the specifications include both age squared and living space squared. Estim ating 
the Linear-Log and Log-Log form s resu lt in living space and age being dropped as 
independent variables, however, as including  them  would create near redundant 
variables with their respective squared terms. M odels 6, 7 and 8 are OLS m odels that 
include transform ed variables from a m axim um  likelihood estim ated (M LE) Box-Cox
regression.
These Box-Cox exponents for all th ree  m odels are presented in Table 8. As shown 
by the chi-square statistics, transform ing both the RHS-LHS indicate significant 
exponents, the Box-Cox coefficients d iffe r  significantly from a linear, inverse, or 
logarithm ic values of 1,-1 or 0. T ransform ing  the LHS draw s a sim ilar analysis, as does
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transform ing the RHS only. The RHS on ly  transform ation does support inclusion o f  the 
quadratic forms o f age and living space, as indicated in the previously cited literature.
Table 8: Regression Results o f the Three M LE Box-Cox Model Specifications used to 
G enerate the Theta/Lambda, Theta and L am bda M odels and Tests o f S ignificance for 
These Functional Forms.
V ariable T ransform ations 
o f  both side w / 
separate 
param eters
Transform ations 
o f  left hand side 
only
T ransfo rm ations of 
right hand  side only
Lam bda (RHS) 0.7408366 2.38379
C hi2 9 4 2 * * * 36.20***
T heta  (LHS) 0.0946368 0.1219783
C hi2 5.44*** 7.69***
LR chi2 3545*** 3531*** 5024***
Chi2
T heta& /or lam bda= - 1 3675*** 3927*** 3304***
= 0 31*** 58*** 2635***
= I 3392*** 3378*** 752***
Coefficients are output from Stata 7. Statistical Significance is * 1%.
The Theta-Lam bda coefficients from T able  8 were used to transform  the specified 
variables for models 6, 7 and 8. For exam ple, the Theta-Lam bda (model 6, linear- 
linear) model using RHS-LHS Box-Cox param eters was accom plished by pow er 
transform ation o f 0.7408366 for price, and a pow er a transform ation o f 0 .0946368 for 
age, age squared, total rooms, baths, other space, takings*living space, outlier*living 
space, living space, and living space squared. Dum m y variables were not transform ed.
Evaluation Criteria
The eight models, presented in Table 9, w ere com pared by several statistical criteria, 
including R-squared (goodness o f fit), F -statistic (overall fit), Ram sey Reset (Regression
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
specification error test, som etim es referred to as a test for om itted variables, but useful 
for testing functional form ), VIF (variance inflation factor test for harmful 
m ulticollinearity). and C ook-W eisberg (constant variance). These criteria are used in 
conjunction with econom ic analysis and findings from the em pirical literature on 
housing prices. The findings o f Table 9 suggest that some models are w eaker than 
others, though most m odels show striking sim ilarity as to  signs and significance o f 
explanatory variables. T he F-statistics are significant at the one per cent level in all 
cases. The Linear- L inear PSF and the Linear-Log specifications, however, have sm aller 
R-squared values (.541 and .654) when com pared with the other m odels. A com parison 
o f R-squared and quasi R -squared values suggests the relative superiority o f  the Linear- 
Linear and the Lam bda model specifications, though the differences betw een model 
results is surely m inim al and other issues need greater consideration before a more 
definitive conclusion can be made. The Lam bda specification suggests incorporating age 
and living space squared has credence. The Log-Linear specification also has appeal, as 
its heteroscedasticity and om itted variable diagnostics are slightly better than the Linear- 
Linear specification. T he Linear-L inear PSF and Linear-Log have w eaker R-squared 
than the other models but the findings are generally consistent with econom ic theory.
The Linear-Log and Log-Log indicate m ulticollinearity is still present, even after 
dropping variables of interest: still, the rem aining coefficients have the anticipated 
signs. The MLE specifications are all good. In general, these findings are in general 
agreement with expectations.
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Table 9; R egression R esults and D iagnostic Statistics o f Eight OLS M odel 
Specifications
28
Variable Linear-
Linear
Linear-
Linear
PSF
Log-
Linear
Linear-
Log
Log-Log Theta-
Lambda
Theta
Model
Lambda
Model
Takings -60989
4.49***
-24.45
4.96***
-.152
2.36***
-320786
2.42***
-1.16
2.83***
-.070
3.10***
-.092
3.10***
-25593
3.38***
Takings*
Living
Space
25.17
4.64***
.0088
4.49***
6.16e-5
2.39***
41578
2.37***
.15
2.82***
2.25e-4
3.31***
3.86e-5
3.05***
1.50C-4
4.11***
Living
Space
26.28
4.49***
-.018
9.73***
.00045
18.98***
Dropped Dropped .0013
3.91***
2.27e-4
19.36**
*
5.00e-4
26.1***
Living
Space
Sqd
.0036
8.88***
1.46e-6
9.91***
-2.48e-8
12.81***
63976
12.06***
.39
23.70***
-5.59e-7
7.85***
I.14C-S
II.98**
-9.1C-14
25.4***
Total
Rooms
-4604
3.76***
-.54
1.23
.0045
.77
-48386
4.20***
-.0073
.21
-6.64e-4
.19
3.71e-4
.13
-226
9.58***
Baths 9776
3.91***
.48
.53
.022
1.87**
3332
.38
-.056
2.09**
.0086
1.51
.12
2.02**
1420
8.67***
Other
Space
15.71
4.40***
.00476
3.76***
6.29e-5
3.70***
-1195
.95
.00164
.42
1.37e-4
3.91***
3.57e-5
4 .2 8 '* *
3.66e-4
6.98***
Age -1765
5.49***
-1.300
11.16***
-.0152
9.95***
Dropped Dropped -.0107
8.63***
-.00733
9.78***
-2.339
1.80
Age sqd 53.78
5.46***
.0388
10.85***
4.13e-4
8.82***
-180
.24
-.0143
6.28***
6.5Ie-4
6.88***
1.98e-4  
8.60***
6.98e-4
3.91***
Upgrade -11847
2.18**
-11.16
5.66***
-.743
2.87***
-6591
.85
-.036
1.51
-.0216
3.01***
-.0396
3.12***
-9432
2.08**
Intercom 39148
6.84***
11.93
5.71***
.0729
2.66***
67258
7.72***
.117
4.37***
.0274
3.62***
.0470
3.50***
33736
6.87***
Fireplace 13657
5.35***
3.47
3.75***
.0830
6.84***
-944
.24
.0367
3.03***
.0201
5.91***
.0405
6.80***
15263
7.27***
Pool 13922
3.92***
6.51
5.06***
.116
6.88***
15694
2.91***
.1086
6.54***
.0307
6.58***
.0577
6.96***
13215
4.43***
Jacuzzi 14509
2.82***
3.54
1.89
.0335
1.37
10495
1.34
.041
1.70
.0128
1.89
.0216
1.80
18457
4.20***
Septic 43624
5.90***
10.17
3.79***
.0816
2.32**
45147
4.17***
.190
5.70***
.0373
3.89***
.0535
3.10***
19052
2.91***
Outlier -17708
3.41***
97.99
24.26***
.485
9.15***
-3.70e6
29.55***
1.388
3.60***
.146
7.74***
.242
9.30***
102922
15.4***
Outlier*
Living
Space
198.25
50.25***
.00352
2.46***
4.93e-5
2.63***
535592
31.86***
-.103
1.99**
1.62e-4
2.78***
4.79e-5
5.21***
6.5e-4
64.5***
Takings*
Outlier
-1.89e5
8.51***
-53.516
6.61***
-.0776
.73
-338773
9.92***
-.081
.77
-.0419
1.43
-.0767
1.47
-77629
4.10***
C oefficients are output from  
statistics are absolute values, 
indicated as a 2-tailed test.
Stata 7. Statistical Significance is *ïQ9c;**5%:***l%. t-
VIF is average o f  all variables. t-statistical significance
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T ab le  9: C ontinued
Variable Linear-
Linear
Linear-
Linear
PSF
Log-
Linear
Linear-
Log
Log-Log Theta-
Lambda
Theta
Model
Lambda
Model
One Car 
Garage
12125
1 .9 9 "
2.41
1.09
-.0287
.99
17847
1.71**
-.0424
1.32
-.00371
.46
-.0100
.70
-11559
2.32**
Two Car 
Garage
22953
5 .9 0 " *
13.30
13.32***
.232
17.7***
1337
.30
.170
12.5***
.0595
16.1*'*
.112
17.5***
25445
11.5***
>Two
Car
Garage
17129
3.41***
14.02
7.70***
.203
8.49***
12124
1.61
.163
7.02***
.0534
8.07***
.0992
8.47***
25213
6.18***
Location
162-
35.36
37780
6.02***
18.40
8.08***
.197
6.61***
25677
2.67***
.158
5.33***
.0555
6 .6 8 " *
.102
6.94***
40037
7.55***
Location 
177- 
1.2.3.4
-5903
2.08**
1.085
1.05
.0106
.79
4312
1.02
.0294
2.26**
.00557
1.50
.00412
.62
-4426
1.85
1994 -6150
1.16
-2.52
1.31
-.0349
1.39
-5910
.73
-.0371
1.49
-.0106
1.53
-.0177
1.44
-4487
1.00
1995 -2148
.39
.926
.47
-.0184
.71
-487
.06
-.0171
.67
-.00519
.72
-.00854
.67
-1213
.26
1996 1754
.32
2.55
1.28
.0240
.92
-344
.04
.0262
1.02
.00724
1.00
.0124
.97
2748
.59
Constant 41956
6.29***
89.75
336***
10.67
336***
-739432
12.14***
5.85
31.2***
2.664
2 3 4 * "
3.66
2 3 5 * "
59737
13.0"*
R-
squared
.8523 .541 .796 .654 .77 .811 .813 .894
Quasi-R2 .722 .756 .798
F-statistic 493 101 333 175 369 368 372 717
Ramsey 
Reset (F)
472 217 89 1344 58 87 89 161
Cook
Wcisberg
ctii2
32868 14921 1043 104942 1509 1786 1808 15498
VIF
(overall)
5 5 5 49 49 6 5 5
C oefficients are output from 
statistics are absolute values, 
indicated as a 2-tailed test.
Stata 7. Statistical Significance 
VIF is average o f all variables.
is»10% ;**5% ;*** l% . t-
. t-statistical significance
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T able 10: Sum m ary A nalysis o f V ariables Influence on Price at 5%  S ignificance Level
V ariable Null
H ypothesis
Alt.
H ypothesis
No. of
M odels
Ho
A ccepted
N o. of 
M odels Ha 
A ccepted
C onclusions
T akings = 0 ; not= 0 0 8 Takings occur at a d iscount
Takings* 
L iving Space
=0; no t= 0 0 8 Vertical inequity; larger hom es receive 
more com pensation than sm aller homes
L iving Space =0: >0 0  o f 6 6 o f  6 As expected  exclud ing  p sf m odel
L iving Space 
sqd
=0; no t= 0 0 8 Price and L iving Space have a 
nonlinear re la tionsh ip ; sign o f 
coefficient inconsisten t; 3 negative and 
5 positive
T otal Rooms = 0 ; not= 0 6 2 May be in teracting  w ith L iving Space
Baths = 0 ; not= 0 6 2 G enerally as expected
O ther Space =0 . >0 3 5 As expected
Age =0; <0 0 6 o f  6 As expected
A ge sqd = 0 ; not=0 1 7 Price and age have a non linear 
relationship
C onstant =0; >0 1 7 G enerally as expected ; L inear-Log 
Model had neg. coeffic ien t
Upgrade = 0 ; not= 0 2 6 A ssessor defin ition  may be illogical
Intercom = 0 ;> 0 0 8 As expected
Fireplace = 0 ;> 0 1 7 As expected
Pool =0; >0 0 8 As expected
Jacuzzi =0; >0 3 5 As expected
Septic =0; >0 0 8 As expected
O ne C ar 
G arage
= 0 ;> 0 6 2 W eakly as expected
T w o C ar 
G arage
=0; >0 1 7 As expected
> T w o Car 
G arage
=0; >0 1 7 As Expected
Location
162-35,36
=0; no t= 0 0 8 Better area than nearer strip
Location
177-1.2,3.4
=0; no t= 0 6 2 Inconclusive; w eak influence
1994 =0; >0 8 0 Not an influential variable
1995 =0; >0 8 0 Not an influential variable
1996 =0: >0 8 0 Not an influential variab le
O utlier =0; >0 1 7 Outliers are im portant
O utlier* 
L iv ing  Space
=0; >0 0 8 G utliers*L iving S pace  is im portant
Takings* 
O u tlier |
=0; >0 5 5 outlier takings have low er price, all 
else equal
The t-statistics are absolute values, tested at 5%, in accord with their respective one-tail 
or two-tail criteria.
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O m itted Variables
The om itted variable problem  is an inherent condition o f housing data, including 
this data set. Many variables are available for potential selection as explanatory 
variables, but the fundamental assum ption that house characteristics are homogenous 
stretches reality. The type o f  flooring, cabinets, counter tops and o ther variables are 
seldom  accounted for in the available data. There is also no direct m eans o f accounting 
for tastes, level o f m aintenance, and other matters that can influence price. For instance, 
flooring can be linoleum or m arble, old o r new, but data alm ost never accurately 
distinguishes uniqueness. It can be argued that larger, newer hom es w ith intercoms, 
pools and Jacuzzis, characteristics described in this database, are m ore likely to have a 
higher price per square foot, but such am enity variables may capture only some 
undescribed uniqueness. In all these specifications, the results from  the Ram sey Reset 
test suggests possible om itted variables, leaving open the issue o f  best functional form. 
O m itted independent variables or heteroscedasticity (Kennedy) can bias the coefficient 
estim ates o f the included independent variables. First, unless the m ean o f  an om itted 
variable is zero, the constant will be biased. Second, only if an om itted  variable is 
orthogonal to included variables w ill there be no bias introduced into those coefficients. 
Third, the explanatory pow er o f the m odel suffers by not including an important 
variable. The results in Table 9 and 10 have coefficient signs as predicted  and the fits 
are reasonably good. Undescribed uniqueness aside, these prelim inary results appear 
adequate in that the results are consisten t across a number o f  functional form 
specifications, signs o f coefficients are consistent with what is expected  and coefficients
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 2
are statistically significant, results that are usually achieved w hen no om itted variables 
problem s exist.
M ulticollinearity
The VIF (variance inflation factor) test for harm ful m ulticollinearity  is good when 
the right hand side of the equation is a linear, but poor if a  log. M ulticollinearity appears 
to be an issue in the Linear-Log and Log-Log specifications. T he overall VIF exceeds 
49, well beyond the value deem ed acceptable. Variables were dropped for estimation 
because o f  high collinearity. Still m ulticollinearity does not bias coefficient estimates. 
R ather, it increases standard errors and reduces t-statistics. Not surprisingly, the rooms, 
o ther space, and the interaction variable o f  Takings*O utlier w ere statistically 
insignificant. All in all, however, the m odels have good t-statistics across a wide array 
o f explanatory variables.
D ropping a variable is one corrective action. The num eric variables total rooms and 
baths are not typically statistically significant in any o f  these m odels, but no strong 
theoretical argum ent can be m ade for dropping them. O ther authors have also found 
total room s and baths to be weak explanatory variables, so this problem  is somewhat 
com m on. Several dummy variables were not always statistically  significant, particularly 
year o f  sale and location, but these have a theoretical value suggesting their inclusion. It 
is relevant to note, however, that although the VIF test provides an acceptable average 
value, living space has the highest variable VIF in all functional form s. The VIF test 
indicates serious multicollinearity w hen the specification uses the log o f RHS variables, 
and the variables associated with living space and age. These variables, however, are
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theoretically critical and are included in the analysis, except w here these variables are 
dropped by the statistical software.
Heteroscedasticity
As M ankiw  (1990) states “H eteroscedasticity has never been a reason to throw out 
an otherw ise good m odel.” and as G ujarati (1995) adds, “But it should not be ignored 
either.” A critical assum ption o f  OLS estim ation is constant variance o f  independent 
variables, or homoscedasticity. N on-constant variance, or heteroscedasticity, does not 
create bias nor harm consistency properties o f OLS estimators, but these estim ators no 
longer are o f minimum variance, and thus are not as efficient, and can result in 
m isleading t-tests and F-tests. The Cook-W eisberg general statistic indicates possible 
heteroscedasticity, statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases. Having identified 
the presence o f heteroscedasticity still leaves open the question o f  how best to address 
the problem . Furthermore, heteroscedastic error terms may also arise with a less than 
adequate specification o f functional form  or om itted variables. T hus, non-constant error 
term s may occur within the context o f  o ther m odeling issues, further confounding the 
analysis. Regression modeling m ust balance all these issues.
Heteroscedasticity is an efficiency concern, not one of bias or consistency. Since the 
true variance is unknown, weighted least squares is not a feasible rem ediation. An 
alternative that is available. W hite’s m ethod, is used to test the L inear-L inear, Log 
Linear, and Theta models. In these cases. W hite’s method produces heteroscedasticity- 
corrected standard errors larger than OLS standard errors and therefore sm aller t-siatistic 
values, but identical coefficients as w ith OLS estimates. As Table 11 show s. Takings 
and Takings* Living Space rem ain significant in all models. L iving Space and Living
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4
Space Squared are also significant except in the L inear-L inear model. It is difficult to 
conclude whether heteroscedasticity , om itted variables, o r both cause these diagnostic 
results, but the issue o f undescribed uniqueness likely contributes to the problem.
The W hite adjustm ent indicates that despite potential heteroscedasticity. all three 
m odels provide a reasonable specification.
Findings on M odel Variables 
It appears that despite the potential issues o f om itted variables, heteroscedasticity, and 
m ulticollinearity, the e igh t OLS m odel specifications o f Table 9 do provide information 
from  which conclusions m ay be draw n. Table 10 com bines all the specifications, 
providing a summ ary score card o f  how each variable fares. A m ajor finding is that the 
accept/reject decision is generally consistent across functional forms, coefficients follow 
the anticipated signs, and conclusions are supported with statistical findings. It is 
apparent from this analysis that m ore than one functional form  could be used for further 
analysis. The Linear-L inear M odel has special appeal, how ever, as it is straightforward 
to understand and interpret, has generally favorable statistics that are as good as the 
other models in term s o f  d iagnostic evaluation results, and m ost importantly, the 
findings generally agree w ith w hat is anticipated from econom ic theory. This Linear- 
Linear specification is, therefore, the basis o f further tests, interpretations, and 
conclusions. This is supported  by ancillary reporting o f the Log-Linear and Theta 
m odels to evaluate consistency across functional form.
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Table 11: Selected V ariables o f Takings and L iving Space, Coefficients and t-values 
Before and A fter Correction: W hite ’s H eteroscedasticity-corrected S tandard E rror 
M ethod to R em ediate N onconstant Variance.
M odel Linear-Linear Log-Linear T heta-L inear
Variable Before A fter Before A fter Before A fter
Takings -60989
4.49***
-60989
2.61***
-.15
2.36***
-.15
2.03**
-.092
3.10***
-.092
2.31**
Takings*Living
Space
25.17
4.64***
25.17
2.73***
6 .16e-4 
2.39***
6 .16e-4 
2.14**
3.86e-5
3.05***
3.86e-5
2.50***
Living Space 26.28
4.49***
26.28
1.15
.00045
18.98***
.00045
7.89***
2.27e-4
19.36***
2 .27e-4
7.16***
Living Space 
Squared
.0036
8.88***
.0036
1.16
-2.48e-8
12.81***
-2.48e-8
4.10***
-1.14e-8
2.16**
-1.14e-8
3.28***
Coefficients are output from 
statistics are absolute values.
Stata 7. Statistical Significance is *10% :**5% :***1% . t-
Vertical Inequity is Suggested 
Figures 2 and 3 dem onstrate the im portant concept o f vertical inequity betw een the 
estim ated m arket price and Takings com pensation, suggested by the L inear-L inear and 
other m odel specifications. The Linear-Linear m odel specification indicates em inen t 
dom ain takings include an initial discount that d im inishes with size o f  hom e, becom ing 
a prem ium  with large hom es. There are many characteristics of a home, and not all 
homes have all characteristics or equal num ber o f  characteristics, but all else equal, my 
analysis indicates a dim inishing discount as hom e size increases and a prem ium  with 
large hom es. Figure 3 reflects the 88 takings at a discount (77%) on hom es o f  less than 
2,411 square feet o f living space, suggesting m ost takings were at a discount. T he Log- 
Linear and Theta-L inear specifications predict sim ilar results to the L inear-L inear 
model; however, these tw o m odels suggest decidedly  m ore moderate vertical inequity . 
M oreover, it is relevant to note that in the range o f  living space for m ost hom es, the
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Figure 3: Frequency Distribution o f L iving Space for Takings
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discount or prem ium  is less dramatic than at the extrem es. Yet. vertical inequity is 
demonstrated in all three cases.
Elasticity
It is evident that the relationship o f Takings, Takings*L iving Space and Price (as 
indicated by a discount or prem ium ) is an im portant one. The price elasticity o f demand 
for Takings*Living Space can add insight into the relationship between size o f home 
and takings com pensation. Because this elasticity is not constant. I com pare price 
elasticity of dem and for living space where living space is 1.254 square feet (the first 
quartile, an implied discount), and at 2.384 square feet (the third quartile. an im plied 
premium), for the L inear-L inear Model, presented in Table 12. These estim ates are for 
em inent domain takings, and thus approxim ate the elasticity living space o f 1.254square 
feet and 2,384square feet, points on the line presented in Figure 2. The price elasticity o f 
dem and for living space in both cases is elastic, and is greater for the sm aller hom e. 
Elasticity decreases with size o f home, expected w ith a positively sloped line. In other 
w ords. Takings*Living Space o f a sm aller home is m ore price sensitive than o f  a larger 
home.
Table 12: Price E lasticity for Living Space Estim ated for Takings Properties a t the First 
and Third Quartile for Living Space
Variable First Quartile Third Q uartile
Living Space 1254 2384
Estimated Price 51081 80780
Elasticity 1.55 1.29
V alues for Living Space are the inversion o f Stata ou tput providing % change in y for a 
% change in x.
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Horizontal Inequity is Suggested 
Another analysis is for horizontal inequity. W hereas vertical equity was proxied by 
the takings difference and Takings*Living Space, horizontal inequity is. at least in pan. 
measured by the residuals, or unexplained error o f the regression. The theory o f  hedonic 
analysis would im ply that, all else being equal, one should expect two hom es with the 
exact same features sold at the same time should receive the same price. The reality of 
the market, however, is that, with different buyers and different sellers this is actually 
unlikely. It is likely, how ever, that the forces of supply and demand would keep prices 
within a relatively sm all range. Eminent domain, on the other hand, rests on an inherent 
equity principle that governm ent treats all equally, and sellers get an equivalent deal. As 
a rough test for horizontal equity, I normalize the residuals to living space, and test if 
takings differ from the estim ated market price. The hypothesis is:
(Takings Residuals) - (Market Residuals) =  0 
Living Space Living Space
For this two-tailed test, the results are presented in Table 13.
The t-statistic is significant at the 5% level so the null hypothesis is rejected. The
residuals (unexplained error) o f  the Linear-Linear m odel, normalized to living space.
(residuals/living space) for takings, are larger than the same measure for the m arket
Table 13: Horizontal Inequity: M eans Test o f Takings and M arket data
Group O bservations M ean Std. Dev
Market 2134 75.358 17.548
Takings 115 79.892 20.862
Combined 2249 75.590 17.756
t-statistic 2.287**
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transactions. This can imply that these takings, for a given size o f home, vary in price 
more than the m arket. From  this one could infer that, relative to the market, som e 
horizontal inequity ex isted  in this sample o f em inent dom ain takings.
Alternatively, it cou ld  also merely show that the m odel reflects market prices belter 
than takings prices; or that the market process, the takings process, or both are 
inefficient. Case and Schiller (1989) present sound argum ents for housing m arket 
inefficiency, including random  factors affecting price. These include not only 
transaction costs, carrying costs and taxes, but also noise in price due to im perfections 
in the market for housing. These imperfections can include the random behavior such as 
arrival of interested purchasers and real estate agent behavior, such that sale price is not 
identical to market price. As my discussion o f the process o f em inent dom ain indicates, 
there are a num ber o f  potential inefficiencies that m ight preclude duplication o f  takings 
compensation for near identical properties. N evertheless, with the market as a 
benchmark, this evidence suggests greater inequity, inefficiency, or both in the takings 
process.
Chow Test for D ifferences Across 
Takings and M arket D ata Sets 
In addition to providing insight into the overall fit o f  the model, the F-statistic using 
C how ’s approach enables testing whether o r not the regression coefficients o f the 
market and takings da ta  sets differ significantly.
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The null hypothesis for comparison is that the tw o regression coefficients are 
equivalent. The appropriate F-statistic is:
[(RSScomb.ncd-RSS^erRSS,ak,ngs)/(23+l)]/[(RSSnurkc<+RSSuJungs)/(2134-Fll5-2(23)-2)] 
=[(4.60-4.09-0.1 l)/24]/[(4.09-t4).l 1)/(2201)] = [.0167/.00191] = 8.75 
Fcnucai(23.2201)= 1.85
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected; the tw o data sets do not have equivalent 
coefficients. A close inspection o f  the data in Table 14 exposes an even clearer insight. 
Note that the Takings price regression has three significant explanatory variables; living 
space, upgrade and pool. On the other hand, the M arket price regression has m any 
significant explanatory variables. One can infer from  this that the m arket pricing 
mechanism is much m ore com plex than may be used determining fair m arket value in 
em inent domain takings. T his has potential policy im plications in that hedonic pricing 
m ight be a powerful addition to  the takings process o f estim ating fair m arket value, and 
may improve equity am ong sellers.
As a final point to add  to this perspective. I calculated the two data se ts’ diagnostics 
tests (Ramsey Reset. V IF. and Cook-W eisberg). As Table 15 suggests, it is apparent 
there is a potential for d ifferen t price generation processes between the data sets.
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Table 14: C om bined , M arket and Takings R egressions and Statistics fo r Chow  Test
Variable C om bined  Data Set 
2249 observations
M arket D ata Set 
2 134 observations
Takings Data Set 
115 observations
L inear Log-Linear Linear Log-linear Linear Log-Linear
R-sq'd .852 .796 .850 .79 .910 .904
RSS 4 .6 0 e l2 100 4 .2 6 e l2 95 I . H e l l  ^ 3.36
ESS 2 .5 3 e l3 388 2 .4 2 e l3 349 1.12el2 31.65
TSS 2 .9 9 e l3 487 2 .84e l3 443 1.23el2 35.01
Living 30.21 .00045 22.49 1 .000436 100 .000868
Space 5.92*** 18.98*** 4.56*** 17.79*** 3.58*** 5.44***
Living .0036 -2.48e-8 .00373 -2.37e-8 -.004 -8.77e-8
Space Sqd 8.88*** 12.81*** 9.14*** 12.14*** .76 3.12***
Total -4604 .0045 -4389 .00481 3510 .016
Rooms 3.76*** .77 3.50*** .80 .81 .67
Baths 9776 .022 11574 .0291 -12992 -.074
3.91*** 1.87** 4.55*** 2.39*** 1.25 1.29
Other 15.71 6.29e-5 17.32 6.95e-5 -3.71 7.33e-6
Space 4 .40*** 3.70*** 4.52*** 3.79*** .41 .15
Age -1765 -.0152 -1889 -.016 -1850 -.015
5.49*** 9.95*** 5.82*** 10.22*** .80 1.19
Age 53.78 4.13e-4 56.51 .0004318.9 28.68 -.000210
sqd 5.46*** 8.82*** 5.60*** 1 *** .58 .76
Up­ -11847 -.743 -10936 -.064 -25605 .164
grade 2.18** 2.87*** 1.79* 2.20** 2.37** 2.75***
Inter­ 39148 .0729 25914 .0333 10258 .010
com 6.84*** 2.66*** 3.97*** 1.06 .74 .013
Fire­ 13657 .0830 14110 .0845 7083 .072
place 5.35*** 6.84*** 5.42*** 6.77*** .71 1.50
Pool 13922 .116 14646 .117 23871 .139
3.92*** 6.88*** 3.95 6.56*** 2.59*** 2.73***
Jacuz­ 14509 .0335 15612 .0036 27186 .059
zi 2.82*** 1.37 2.98*** 1.46 1.29 .51
Septic 43624 .0816 68600 .149 -5452 .00589
5.90*** 2.32** 7.96*** 3.61*** .38 .08
Outlier -17708 .485 -191249 4.60 70831 .856
3.41*** 9.15*** 17.21*** 8.63*** .91 1.98**
Outlier* 198.3 4.93e-5 204 5.92e-5 17.14 -.000159
Living
Space
50.3*** 2.63*** 51.49*** 3.12*** .16 1.07
Constant 41956 10.67 34678 10.63 7422 10.84
6.29*** 336*** 4.64*** 297*** .10 26.68***
One Car 12125 -.0287 14577 -.024 -30410 -.128
Garage 1.99** .99 2.37** .82 1.07 .81
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Table 14: Continued
Variable Com bined Data Set 
2249 observations
M arket Data Set 
2134 observations
T akings Data Set 
115 observations
Linear Log-Linear Linear Log-linear L inear Log-Linear
Tw o Car 22953 -.0287 25166 .248 3114 .017
Garage 5.90*** .99 8.84*** 18.21*** .33 .33
>Tw o C ar 17129 .232 15654 .208 37817 .148
Garage 3.41*** 17.7*** 3.03*** 8.42*** 1.88* 1.33
Location 37780 .203 44528 .217 -3507 -.079
162-35.36 6.02*** 8.49*** 6 71*** 6.82*** .06 .25
Location -5903 .197 -7788 -4.58e-5 7911 -.073
177- 
1.2.3.4
2.08** 6.61*** 2.71*** 0.00 .13 T)
1994 -6150 .0106 1098 .00963 -2552 -.022
1.16 .79 .17 .31 .30 .48
1995 -2148 -.0184 4382 .0242 -13706 -.064
.39 .71 .67 .77 .99 .83
1996 1754 .0240 9171 .071 -4252 -.064
.32 .92 1.40 2.27** .26 .89
Coefficients 
statistics are
are output from Stata 7. 
absolute values.
Statistical Significance is *\09c:**59c:***\9c. t-
Table 15: D iagnostic Tests from the M arket and Takings Data Sets Regressions
Test Market
Linear
M arket Log- 
Linear
Takings
Linear
Takings Log- 
Linear
R-squared .85 .77 .91 .89
F-test 545 327 42 35
Ram sey Reset Test 479 114 4.2 5.2
Cook-W eisberg
Chi2
35831 1256 17.21 3.0
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O m itted Variables. Potential Bias.
A nd Unknown Factors 
It is possible that the m odel specifications have an inherent b ias. if. for instance, 
em inent domain takings are not random  events, similar to self-selection, or if the 
Takings coefficient is system atically related to unobserved factors. To test if this is the 
case. I use the treatment effect m odel as discussed by W ooldridge (2000) and Greene 
(2000). The Takings coefficient controls for its uniqueness in the m odel, but may be 
m easuring some unknown variable as well. Houses selected for taking by the 
governm ent are not com pletely random  events, so it is uncertain w hether the takings 
indicator is measuring additional inform ation that introduces bias. In this case study, 
most takings occur in a selected project area, so location may introduce systematic bias. 
No new hom es were taken, so age m ay introduce systematic bias. No other variables has 
a definitive theoretical basis for inclusion in the treatment. The treatm ent model uses the 
same price equation as (3-1) with Takings as the treated variable, based on location and 
age. The specifications tested are the Linear-Linear, the Log-Linear, and the Theta- 
Linear (M LE), the three specifications with favorable properties and diagnostics.
Price =  f (takings indicator, location indicator, year o f sale.
house characteristics, outlier effects)
Takings =f (location indicator, age) (5-1 )
The treatm ent model Null hypothesis is:
The error terms of the price equation are uncorrelated to the error term s o f the Takings 
treatm ent equation. As shown in Table 16. in all three m odels, the coefficients of the
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Takings equations are statistically significant, and the likelihood ratio test indicates the 
error terms are not correlated. It is im portant to rem em ber this analysis o f  eminent 
domain takings begins with econom ic principles, and is follow ed by econometric 
analyses. The combining o f two d istinct data sets into a single specification increases 
the potential for issues to arise and m ay suggest tem pered conclusions, but these results 
are consistent across functional form.
Table 16: Linear-Linear M odel Regression with Treatm ent o f Takings as Function of 
Selected Independent Variables
Variable
M odel
L inear-L inear Log-Linear Theta-L inear
Price T reatm ent Price Treatm ent Price Treatm ent
Takings -61040
4.35***
-.18
2.49**
-.100
2.91***
Takings* 
Living Space
25.16
4.64***
.000057
2.21**
.000037
2.94***
Living Space 26.28
5.26***
.00045
19.10***
.00023
19.48***
Living Space 
Squared
.0036
8.94***
-2.47e-08
12.87***
-1.14e-8
12.05***
Age -1766
5.52***
.053
6.95***
-.015
10.06***
.054
6.96***
-.0074
9.86***
053
6.96***
Age Squared 53.79
5.47***
.00042
8.89***
.00020
8.61***
Location 162- 
35.36
37823
5.39***
3.70
10.67***
.22
5.28***
3.71
10.54***
.109
5.81***
3.71
10.58***
Location 177- 
1.2.3.4
-5901
2.09**
1.38
3.69***
.011
.86
1.38
3.65***
.0044
.66
1.38
3.66***
C onstant 41956
6.33***
-4.32 
11.2***
10.67
339***
-4.34
11.06***
3.66
237
-4.33
11.10***
Rho .00094 .119 .0696
Sigm a 44309 .211 .10
lam bda 41.5 .025 .0072
Likelihood 
Ratio chi2 
(rho=0) 
Prob>chi2
.0
.99
.75
0 .39
.41
.52
LR tests o f independent equations (rho=0) by Chi(2). Theta-L inear uses 
price^'0.1219783
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CH APTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
Takings o f homes in the M cCarran Airport study area were not paid the expected 
market value, other things equal. I found a discount paid to ow ners of sm aller homes, 
and a prem ium  paid to owners o f larger homes, suggesting vertical inequity. In all the 
specifications tested, the Takings dum m y variable coefficient is negative and typically 
significant, implying a discount. In all the specifications, the Takings*Living Space 
variable coefficient is positive and typically significant, im plying vertical inequality. 
Horizontal inequity was also evident, as reflected in the variance o f residuals. The 
market and takings data sets fail the C how  test and evaluating the data sets separately 
provide credence to the possibility o f  differing m echanisms determ ining price.
The results are somewhat surprising in that McCarran International Airport is very 
much an integral aspect o f Las Vegas. It is the primary access point for 36 million 
visitors per year, an engine that drives the local economy. It is governed by Clark 
County, a body of locally elected officials. It has worked closely with other local 
agencies to help solve area transportation and flood control issues, and has a reputation 
of trying to be a good neighbor. It has access to Federal funding, so all money is not 
generated locally. One might expect if any government body had a  policy to pay a 
prem ium  for takings; it would be a w ell-funded, local agency like M cCarran Airport.
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This lim ited data analysis indicates takings com pensation prem ium s were not 
generally paid, and begs the question o f w hat m ay be occurring w ith non-local agencies, 
poorly funded agencies, and private com panies provided with the pow er o f eminent 
dom ain. Further research will hopefully expand this case study. Takings compensation 
in o ther jurisdictions may be different than in C lark County. N evada. For exam ple a 
slow er growing regional econom y w ith a less transient population m ight produce 
different outcom es. Undescribed uniqueness o f housing characteristics further 
constrains analysis of eminent dom ain takings. Additional study and review of public 
policy alternatives is warranted before one can conclude that com pensation in eminent 
dom ain takings approxim ates estim ated m arket price.
It is. however, quite conceivable that incorporating hedonic analysis into the 
determ ination o f eminent dom ain takings com pensation might better approxim ate 
m arket price, if market price is the criterion for fair market value and thus just 
com pensation.
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